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Theological Aesthetics and the Many Pragmatisms of Alejandro 
García-Rivera
Christopher D. Tirres
DePaul University
My first encounter with Alejandro García-Rivera was through a letter. In the late 1990s, I had 
applied to the doctoral program at the Graduate Theo-
logical Union (GTU), and a few weeks after having been 
accepted, I received a personal letter of invitation from 
him. In the letter, Alex (as I would be privileged to call 
him later) described the GTU as a promising new center 
for the study of theological aesthetics. I was intrigued by 
this phrase, “theological aesthetics,” for it was new to me. 
Moreover, I was deeply touched by the fact that Alex took 
the time to correspond with me personally. I felt honored 
that such a respected academic would go out of his way 
to reach out to me. 
As things turned out, I ended up staying on the East 
Coast for my doctoral work. Fortunately, however, through 
the Academy of Catholic Hispanic Theologians of the 
United States (ACHTUS), I eventually got to know Alex 
and many of his talented students. Over the years, I have 
been impressed to hear stories of how deeply Alex cared for 
them. Especially significant is the fact that Alex directed to 
completion the largest number of Latina Ph.D. theologians 
in the United States.1 By all accounts, he was a Doktorvater 
in the deepest and best sense of the word.
In what follows, I will reflect a little on Alex’s en-
gagement with U.S. pragmatism, an area in which I do 
work as well.2 Let me say up front that my approach to 
pragmatism has much in common with Alex’s, but it also 
diverges from it in some respects. As for similarities, we 
both take everyday experience as a methodological starting 
point and ending point; we are both interested in offering 
a non-reductive account of reality; and we both take the 
question of aesthetics seriously. As for differences, one 
might point to the fact that Alex and I were introduced 
to pragmatism in two different intellectual settings. At 
Berkeley, and owing much to the influence of Don Gelpi 
and Frank Oppenheim, Alex gravitated toward the work 
of Charles Sanders Peirce and Josiah Royce. I, in turn, 
studied under Cornel West, Hilary Putnam, and David 
Lamberth, and, as a consequence, I read more William 
James and John Dewey.
Accordingly, when I read Alex’s work in pragmatism, I 
always feel stretched. He reframes pragmatism in ways that 
are refreshing and original and yet, at times perplexing and 
elusive. Throughout his many works, Alex draws on Peirce 
and Royce to shore up what he sees as a promising, yet still 
somewhat deficient, articulation of theological aesthetics 
in the work of Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
As Alex explains, theological aesthetics should encompass 
more than Alexander Baumgarten’s classic articulation of 
aesthetics as the science of sensory knowledge. Instead, for 
Alex, theological aesthetics begs “a more profound question: 
what moves the human heart?” This question, he maintains, 
“brings us closer to the mysterious experience of the truly 
beautiful, an experience that transcends geological space 
and prehistoric time …”3 While Alex credits von Balthasar 
for restoring the ancient theological insight that we know 
God best through, he also shows how the semiotic logic 
and the metaphysics of relations, as developed by Peirce 
and Royce, can give philosophical clarity and depth to von 
Balthasar’s position. 
As one charts the development of Alex’s thought 
from early to later writings, one sees that he adds John 
Dewey’s voice to his pragmatic repertoire. On numerous 
occasions, such as in A Wounded Innocence: Sketches for 
a Theology of Art (2003), Alex speaks glowingly of Dewey, 
who is widely recognized as one of the most important 
philosophers and social critics of the twentieth century. 
Yet, Alex’s appropriation of Dewey sometimes gives rise 
to moments of paradox and ambiguity. In what follows, 
I’d like to reflect on some of these moments in order see 
where Dewey’s pragmatism both fits, and does not fit, 
within Alex’s line of thinking. 
One of Alex’s most explicit statements on Dewey 
is found in his 2006 essay, “Interfaith Aesthetics: Where 
Theology and Spirituality Meet.” Drawn to Dewey’s un-
derstanding of “the religious,” Alex correctly notes that 
Dewey separates out institutional religion from a naturally 
occurring sense of “the religious.” Today, this distinction is 
roughly akin to the difference between being a “religious 
person” versus being a “spiritual person.” The former usually 
has a lot to do with adhering to the tenets of institutional 
religion (Dewey’s “religion”), while the latter speaks to 
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an innate sense of spirituality within all human beings, 
irrespective of one’s affiliation with institutional religion 
(Dewey’s “religious”). Alex writes approvingly of Dewey’s 
“rather provocative thesis” which “attempt[s] an expanded 
notion of faith.” Dewey’s faith, he explains, is “a faith open 
to something bigger than itself.” It is a faith that “points to 
a unity of a whole.”4 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, Alex then imme-
diately moves into a discussion of how Dewey’s insight can 
be applied to Roman Catholic debates around the nature of 
Christian faith. Alex draws a distinction between Vatican 
I’s “extrinsic” understanding of faith, which required the 
“submission of the intellect and will to truths that God 
reveals to men and women,” and Vatican II’s more “in-
trinsic” understanding of faith, wherein faith is “rooted 
in the historical, experiential process culminating in Jesus 
Christ, who reveals to the human his and her very nature.”5 
In drawing this parallel, Alex seems to suggest that 
Dewey’s own organic understanding of faith is akin to 
the vision of faith articulated in Vatican II. This parallel, 
I would argue, is correct, but only up to a certain point. 
Dewey would indeed eschew Vatican I’s extrinsic view of 
faith as an assent to doctrine. But it is only partially correct, 
however, to assume that he would affirm Vatican II’s more 
intrinsic understanding of faith. In other words, Dewey 
would affirm that faith is indeed “rooted in the historical, 
experiential process,” but the mature Dewey would never go 
so far as to say that this process culminates in Jesus Christ, 
as Alex suggests. Thus, I think Alex overstretches his use 
of Dewey here. This is not to say that Dewey couldn’t—or 
indeed shouldn’t—be reconstructed in such a way as to be 
applicable and relevant to institutional religions, Roman 
Catholicism included. In fact, my own work probes this 
very possibility.6 But what I am saying is that this kind of 
reconstruction requires a more explicit analysis of where, 
exactly, Dewey falls short in his analysis of institutional 
religion as well as where we may use his insights produc-
tively and creatively.
A second, and arguably more substantial, tension 
between Alex and Dewey has to do with their respective 
understandings of “the unity of the whole.”7 Since Alex 
never addresses Dewey’s understanding of this idea, we 
must momentarily take a step back and extrapolate where 
such a discussion might have occurred. I believe that Alex’s 
discussion of Peirce’s aesthetics takes us closest to this issue. 
In order to appreciate Alex’s use of Peirce, a word or 
two must be said about the thinkers that, for Alex, lead up 
to Peirce. As already mentioned, Alex turns to the semiotic 
logic of Peirce to add philosophical depth to von Balthasar’s 
theological aesthetics. Equally significant, he also turns to 
Peirce to overcome the nominalism of William of Ockham, 
a 14th century scholastic philosopher. As Alex shows, Peirce 
and Ockham vary significantly in their response to the 
question: “Can something real be said about two very 
different individuals that somehow applies to both of them 
without destroying their individuality?”8 For William of 
Ockham, the answer is no. According to Alex, Ockham 
presupposes an “anthropocentric epistemology” in which 
the human creature knows only percepts (the data of sense) 
and concepts (the constructs of the mind), with the burden 
of epistemology falling on the latter. As a consequence, a 
concept has “reality only to the mind; it is not found in 
the physical world.”9 
Alex takes issue with Ockham’s epistemology, both for 
playing down the role of perception, which has traditionally 
been so central to aesthetics, and, even more significantly, 
for approaching reality dyadically. For Ockham, there are 
only two possibilities: We understand reality either through 
percept or through concepts. 
In response, Alex turns to the thought of Duns Scotus, 
an English contemporary of Ockham, who adds “a third 
element to reality.” Alex explains: 
There exists the physical world of 
the individuals. There also exists the 
conceptual world of the mind. There 
exists, however, a further third reality, 
a metaphysical reality that has one foot 
in the physical world and the other foot 
in the mental world. This metaphysical 
reality, the Common Nature, is part of 
the reality found alongside the phys-
icality of the unique individual even 
if it can only be “seen” by the mind. If 
the physical individual corresponds 
to a visible reality, then the Common 
Nature corresponds to an invisible 
reality, a reality independent of the 
mind and only “seen” by it.10
Alex is drawn to this position, for it underscores three 
different, yet related, modes of being: the physical, the 
logical, and the metaphysical. Alex is especially interested in 
the latter, the metaphysical being, Scotus’ ens reale, which, 
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says Alex, “can only be seen by the ‘mind,’ a reality that 
bridges the chasm” between the physical and the mental.11 
Put another way, Scotus’ metaphysical being serves as an 
important principle of difference that is related to, but 
distinct from, the other two modes of being. All told, 
Scotus’ triadic approach proves so pivotal because it helps 
to “assure the reality of the universal.”12 
As helpful as Scotus is for Alex, Alex finds that Scotus 
does not sufficiently explore the implications of this third 
reality, metaphysical being, for an aesthetics. As Alex puts 
it, Scotus’ world, “a world that is experienced not simply 
by percept and concepts but also by a reality invisible and 
‘in-between,’” is a world that is ready-made for an aesthetics. 
Such a world “can entertain aesthetics not simply as passive 
perception of beauty, nor the purely active act of mind, but 
as a making visible the invisible, an act that involves … the 
whole creature.”13 By taking into account this “invisible 
reality,” such a world “allows room for the spiritual.” In 
a sentence that encapsulates much of what his project is 
all about, Alex writes: “An invisible metaphysical reality 
makes the mind’s act a spiritual act of ‘seeing’ rather than 
a mechanical ‘connecting’ of perceptions.”14 Accordingly, 
Alex wants to extend Scotus’ thought so that it is more 
attentive to this third “in-between” and “invisible” reality 
that “allows room for the spiritual.”
In order to move in this direction, Alex turns to the 
thought of C.S. Peirce, who, “working from Scotus’ founda-
tion, developed a logic based on the metaphysics of relations 
rather than the metaphysics of substance.”15 Peirce therefore 
proves indispensible for Alex because he “introduce[s] a 
new way to understand the transcendentals.”16 
As I read Alex, there are four primary reasons why 
he is drawn to Peirce. First, as just indicated, Peirce helps 
shift the discussion of aesthetics from a discussion about 
a metaphysics of substance to a metaphysics of relations. 
In doing so, Peirce reframes von Balthasar’s (more “sub-
stantial”) understanding of “seeing the form” to a more 
pragmatic understanding of the logic of sign.17 For Alex, 
sign not only “refers to making visible the invisible,” but 
also underscores how substance and Being are intrinsically 
relational. Second, Alex is drawn to the social dimensions 
of Peirce’s (and, later, Royce’s) thought. “Logic,” Peirce 
writes, “is rooted in the social principle.”18 By this, Peirce 
means to say that the validity of any given belief or idea is 
tantamount to what a community of inquirers, through 
the process of sign interpretation, would understand as 
true in the infinite long run. Thus, for Alex and Peirce 
alike, a logic of signs always presumes much more than 
the mental processes of any single individual. Rather, it is, 
by necessity, always a communal affair.
Third, Alex is drawn to Peirce’s idea of the aesthetically 
“good” as a “quality” of experience. Peirce writes:
In the light of the doctrine of cate-
gories, I should say that an object, 
to be esthetically good, must have a 
multitude of parts so related to one 
another as to impart a positive quality 
to their totality; and whatever does this 
is, in so far, esthetically good, no matter 
what the particular quality of the total 
may be. If that quality be such as to 
nauseate us, to scare us, or otherwise 
disturb us to the point of throwing us 
out of the mood of esthetic enjoyment 
. . . then the object remains nonetheless 
esthetically good, although people in 
our condition are incapacitated from 
a calm esthetic contemplation of it.19 
Alex appreciates Peirce’s approach here because it “flings 
the objects of aesthetic appreciation out of the museum 
into the universal world of experience.”20 As Alex makes 
clear from his very earliest works, the aesthetic symbols of 
Hispanic popular religion—the “little stories” of popular 
devotion that are found not in museums or books, but 
rather, in everyday life—can give tremendous insight into 
the meaning, and even mystery, of our humanity.21 Alex thus 
agrees with Peirce that any experience has the potential to 
be aesthetic in quality, even those that we do not typically 
associate with fine art or with beauty. 
Last but not least, Alex agrees with Peirce that aesthetic 
ends serve as regulative ideals. The “End is something that 
gives sanction to action,” writes Peirce.22 For Alex, this 
means simply that “Actions, to be logical, must be guided, 
indeed, initiated, by Ends.”23 Thus understood, the end is 
the regulative lightpost that helps to guide actions. Ends 
give meaning and direction to action. 
One may notice that these last two points regarding 
aesthetic quality and the functional role of ideal ends are 
especially pronounced in the work of John Dewey, to 
whom we now return. In Art as Experience (1934), for 
example, Dewey shifts our understanding of aesthetics from 
a discourse around fine art to a more organic understanding 
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of aesthetic quality, which has the potential to take root 
in any and all forms of experience, everyday experiences 
included. Indeed, Dewey’s aesthetics may be seen as a logical 
outgrowth of his metaphysics, or theory of experience. 
Likewise, Dewey also underscores the functional 
character of ideal ends, which help to guide experience to 
a sense of completeness, wholeness, and, as Dewey often 
puts it, “consummation.” As Dewey explains in A Common 
Faith (1934), religious symbols and religious figures are 
reflections of “moral and other ideal values.” Historic 
personages with divine attributes are “materializations 
of the ends that enlist devotion and inspire endeavor.”24 
This means that the power of religious symbols lies not in 
the fact that they “exist already in some realm of Being,” 
but rather, in the fact that they have been created by the 
“idealizing imagination.” As reflections of ideal ends, they 
gain authority over our volition and emotion. For Dewey, 
the “reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their 
undeniable power in action.”25
In light of these connections between Peirce and Dew-
ey, we may now ask: Up to what point in Alex’s theological 
aesthetics do these pragmatic thinkers prove valuable? Or, 
put negatively, where, exactly, does (or would) Alex find 
these pragmatists no longer useful?
An answer to this question is somewhat easy to deter-
mine in Alex’s assessment of Peirce. At the end of chapter 
four of The Community of the Beautiful: A Theological 
Aesthetics (1999), after having made a strong case for the 
value of Peirce’s semiotics and aesthetics, Alex begins to 
stake out his own ground, showing where Peirce’s thought 
may reach its limits. For Alex, Peirce eventually comes 
up short because he fails fully to address “the intrinsic 
nature of aesthetic norms.”26 “Peirce’s logic of signs had 
given a satisfying answer to the question of how the true 
becomes discovered,” writes Alex, “but left open the implicit 
question of what inspires such discovery in the first place! 
In other words, the Community of the True has some 
genesis. Something must account for initiating such a 
pursuit.”27 For Alex, Peirce’s discussion of aesthetic ideals 
is limited to a discussion of how one adopts ideals and 
how ideals function; it does not fully take up the question 
of the “the ideals in themselves.”28 It is at precisely this 
juncture that Alex calls for a theological aesthetics. What 
is required, he says, is “a theological presupposition so that 
the philosophical may find its completeness.”29 Put another 
way, “The dynamic nature of the aesthetic norm reveals 
a theological presupposition, the symptom of divinity 
making itself manifest in the world of reason.”30If Alex 
finds Peirce’s pragmatic approach to aesthetics somewhat 
unsatisfying, I think he would have even more reservations 
about Dewey’s aesthetics, given Dewey’s suspicion of any 
talk about the intrinsic “nature” of “ideals in themselves.” 
Dewey holds that an inherent vice of idealism is that 
it converts naturally-occurring enjoyed meanings and 
“consummations” of experience into antecedently and a 
priori Realities31. The true power of an ideal lies not in its 
purported intrinsic and self-standing “nature,” but rather, 
in its role or function in guiding human action to a greater 
sense of meaning and value. For Dewey, “To see the ideal 
as ideal means to see it as a possibility of the present, not 
as a pre-existent, self-established reality.”32 
In Experience and Nature (1925, 1st ed.), for example, 
Dewey argues that idealists, who otherwise extol the role of 
thought and the ideals of human aspiration, nevertheless 
often seek to prove once and for all that “these things are 
not ideal but are real—real not as meanings and ideals, 
but as existential being. Thus the assertion of faith in the 
ideal belies itself in the making; these ‘idealists’ cannot 
trust their ideal till they have converted it into existence 
. . .”33 Dewey carries this critique forward in A Common 
Faith when he writes: 
[M]en have gone on to build up vast 
intellectual schemes, philosophies, and 
theologies, to prove that ideals are real 
not as ideals but as antecedently exist-
ing actualities. They have failed to see 
that in converting moral realities into 
matters of intellectual assent, they have 
evinced lack of moral faith. Faith that 
something should be in existence as 
far as lies in our power is changed into 
the intellectual belief that it is already 
in existence. When physical existence 
does not bear out the assertion, the 
physical is subtly changed into the 
metaphysical.34 
As I read both Alex García-Rivera and John Dewey, 
I see significant overlap in their thinking, but I also see 
marked differences. Dewey, it seems to me, would question 
Alex’s underlying commitment to a philosophical idealism, 
whereas Alex would likely want to push past Dewey’s 
instrumentalism to a discussion of theology. Both positions 
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no doubt warrant further investigation. On the one hand, 
would Alex’s use of Royce represent a more acceptable 
version of idealism to Dewey? On the other, is it possible to 
develop a theological aesthetics from within the framework 
of Peirce’s or Dewey’s aesthetics? 
However one may choose to answer these questions, 
one thing is abundantly clear: Alex rarely closes off con-
versations. He borrows eclectically from thinkers, weaving 
a web that is greater than the sum of its parts. This fact 
may lead us to two very different observations. In the first 
place, Alex may be rightfully critiqued at times for leaving 
individual threads in tension or at odds with one another. 
In other words, at the analytical level, his method calls out 
at times for more precision.35 I think it would be a real loss 
if at least some of his colleagues, students, and friends 
didn’t continue to tease out the analytical threads that run 
in different directions throughout his work. This is part of 
taking seriously Alex’s work and, in doing so, honoring it. 
However, I also believe that we have much to learn 
from thinking beyond the level of analysis to thinking more 
inferentially, more speculatively, and more cosmically, as 
Alex does. Alex carried out his intellectual work with the 
mindset of an artist. He had an uncanny ability to piece 
together discreet particulars into larger imaginative wholes. 
And yet Alex was very up front about the fact that his meth-
od “leads to a certain style of writing that not everyone finds 
to be their cup of tea.” Critics, he notes, may find his style 
of writing “beautiful but imprecise, saying too much and 
saying too little,” to which he humbly responds: “To critics 
of my method and style, I beg forgiveness for giving offense. 
Yet I believe whole-heartedly that we must begin to see the 
interconnectedness of the world, to grasp its complexity, 
even if our intellectual traditions have conditioned us to 
seek a different type of grasping.”36 
It may very well be, then, that Alex’s inferential way 
of seeing the world is, in the larger scheme of things, much 
more important than any particular cases of imprecision. 
Alex invites us to switch our thinking to another register 
of thinking, a register that Peirce would call musing, a 
register of puzzlement, inference, and play. This is not 
always easy to do, especially when most of us have been 
trained to analyze things and break things down. Alex’s 
scholarly contributions remind us, however, that although 
the parts are important, we must never lose sight of the 
whole that unites them. From Alex, we learn:
In variety, unity. In particularity, beauty. 
Thank you, Alex.
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